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No Good Deed Goes Unpublished: Precedent-
Stripping and the Need for a New Prophylactic Rule
Edward Cantu*
To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indis-
pensible that they should be bound down by strict rules and
precedents which serve to define and point out their duty in
every particular case that comes before them.. I
The question then arises whether an overworked, underpaid
judiciary confronted with too great a caseload can solve the
problem by giving all of the litigants half a loaf. Or whether
the proper response, given th[eir] diligence obligation,..
mean[s] that judges should not facilitate [Congress's] under-
funding of the judiciary by delivering second class justice.'
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1. INTRODUCTION
One need not be a rigid formalist to find irksome the practice of
judges stripping their opinions of precedential value. But is the
* Civil litigation and appellate attorney, Houston, Texas. Law clerk to the Hon.
Jennifer Walker Elrod, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 2007-08; law clerk to the
Hon. Micaela Alvarez, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas, 2006-07; J.D., Uni-
versity of Texas, 2006. The author would like to thank Lonny Hoffman, Greg Shill and
Mitch Berman for their helpful comments. The author also thanks Judge Elrod, Judge
Alvarez and Dr. Marium Holland for their friendship and support.
1 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
2. Lawrence J. Fox. Those Unpublished Opinions: An Appropriate Expedience or an
Abdication of Responsibility?, 32 HOF5 rRA L. REV. 1215, 1225 (2004).
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practice unconstitutional? Some scholars, and at least one federal
appellate judge, have argued "yes," but on grounds that rattle at
their fault lines. Some of the less ambitious constitutional argu-
ments have proposed that precedent- stripping is per se violative of
individual rights, but these arguments seem to fall short, nagging-
ly so in the minds of readers who want to believe them. This au-
thor is one of the anxious faithful. Still believing the practice of
precedent- stripping to be obnoxious to the fair and principled ad-
ministration of justice, I ask in this article: is the per se unconsti-
tutionality of precedent- stripping a prerequisite for a constitu-
tionally based rule prohibiting precedent-stripping? This article
proposes that it is not, for the Court has a long history of "over-
protecting" rights with "constitutional prophylactic rules" where
doing so is the only feasible way of protecting the "core" constitu-
tional right at issue. In this article I examine the possibility of
borrowing from this prophylactic rule jurisprudence as a basis for
attacking precedent- stripping on constitutional grounds, regard-
less of the possibly per se constitutionality of the practice.
To illustrate the basic obnoxiousness of prece dent- stripping to
the integrity of appellate adjudication, imagine yourself as the
appellant in the following hypothetical, then consider whether you
were denied due process of law and, if so, how you would prove it:
A government official violates your rights, so you file a civil
rights lawsuit. The trial court dismisses your suit, concluding
that the defendant is entitled to some sort of immunity. You ap-
peal. It's a close call. Your argument sounds quite reasonable; it
is a plausible corollary of existing precedent although the appel-
late court has not yet had occasion to expressly say so. There's
only one problem: even though you have a right to an appeal, the
court would rather not deal with your issue. It's too busy. Your
issue is too complicated, or perhaps it's too controversial.
So the court punts your issue. Does it dispose of your appeal on
another ground, perhaps seizing on some jurisdictional roadblock
and noting that it is obliged to do so sua sponte? No, the court
wants to save the issue for the another day, perhaps when it feels
more inclined for whatever reason to parse the Pandora's box of
issues your novel argument implicates. The court issues an opi-
nion affirming the trial court; it addresses your legal argument,
but does so in an exceedingly cursory or even circular fashion. Not
wanting to be bound by what it knows is a less -than-thorough ad-
judication of an important issue, the court includes a curious foot-




Your case was disposed of using what I will hereafter refer to as
a precedent-stripping rule. Since the 1960s, the federal appellate
courts have promulgated rules that allow judges to decide whether
their own opinions will be published in the bound reporters, and
thereby serve as formal and precedential statements of "what the
law is," or whether they will be kept under wraps, never to formal-
ly resurface as precedent even in subsequent cases presenting ef-
fectively identical facts. In the above scenario, were you afforded
"due process of law"? If so, how would you prove it? Are you en-
titled to depose the judges on the panel, send them interrogato-
ries, or ask them to otherwise swear under oath that they disposed
of your case in a summary fashion for a valid reason? These ques-
tions make obvious the insurmountable burden appellants would
face were they to challenge the invalid uses of precedent- stripping
that have become commonplace in the federal courts.
Commentators have paid much critical attention to precedent-
stripping over the past decade, as courts, due to growing casel-
oads, have increasingly relied on the practice as an avenue for
summary disposition. 3 Modern precedent-stripping practices have
been labeled a "scandal of private judging,"14 have allegedly created
"a double-track system [that] allows for deviousness and abuse" 5
and have created a body of "secret law."6 Some judges have joined
in the drumbeat to end the practice. Some of the most persuasive
arguments have called for courts to end precedent-stripping on
prudential grounds,7 a strong argument given the traditional no-
tion that the judiciary, unlike the other two branches, commands
power only through its prestige.8 Those ambitious enough to ar-
3. See generally Richard W. Murphy, Separation of Powers and the Horizontal Force of
Precedent, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1075 (2003); Polly J. Price, Precedent and Judicial Pow-
er After the Founding, 42 B.C. L. REV. 81 (2000); Brian Endter, Note, Death, Taxes, and
Unpublished Opinions: In the Wake of Anastasoff v. United States and Its Holding that
Eighth Circuit Rule 28(A)(7 Unconstitutionally Expands the Judicial Power, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.
J. 613, 622 (200 1): Thomas R. Lee & Lance S. Lehnhof, The Anastasoff Case and the Judi-
cial Power to "Unpublish" Opinions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135 (2001).
4. Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the
U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1435 (2004).
5. Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1995).
6. Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts
Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 71 (2001).
7. See, e.g., Johanna S. Schiavoni, Who's Afraid of Precedent?: The Debate over the
Precedential Value of Unpublished Opinions, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1859, 1876-77 (2002)
('[R]egardless of which constitutional argument ultimately prevails, prudential considera-
tions counsel for uniform circuit rules calling for universal publication and citation . . . .)
8. Hence Alexander Hamilton's description of the judiciary as the 'least dangerous"
branch because it controls neither sword nor purse. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander
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gue that precedent-stripping is per se unconstitutional have ar-
gued that the practice is ultra vires, 9 that forbidding future liti-
gants from relying on prior non-precedential dispositions works an
unconstitutional restraint on speech,10 or that the practice enables
judges' disparate treatment of similarly situated litigants in disre-
gard of the Equal Protection Clause."1 Although these arguments
are debatable and warrant attention, one weakness common be-
tween them is the seeming need to end with a conclusion of per se
unconstitutionality, which may be unnecessarily ambitious. In
this article I discuss a heretofore unexplored procedural due
process route that does not turn on a conclusion of per se unconsti-
tutionality. I examine the basic premises underlying the Supreme
Court's establishment of constitutional prophylactic rules, with a
focus on Miranda v. Arizona.12 I then propose that the insidious
misuse of precedent- stripping by courts presents such a systemic
threat to appellants' procedural due process rights that the need
for a new prophylactic rule forbidding prece dent- stripping in the
Hamilton). The institutional legitimacy concern is not merely academic navel-gazing, as
the issue has reached the mainstream press:
[Situdies of the use of brief circuit court decisions ... have suggested that sketchy
rulings may sometimes be used by judges who want to reach a certain legal result but
are not anxious for their decision to be scrutinized.
Some judges and scholars say the proliferation of one-word decisions and other ab-
breviated procedures is shortchanging litigants in the appellate process by limiting
the consideration given to their cases by appeals judges.
William Glaberson, Caseload Forcing Two-Level System for US. Appeals, N.Y. TIMES,
March 14, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/14/us/caseload-forcing-two-level-system-
for-us-appeals.html?pagewanted=1. On a more academic note, Professor Fallon notes:
[The authority of the Supreme Court is not self-enforcing. To sustain and legitimate
its place in a constitutional democracy, the Court must define for itself a democrati-
cally acceptable role. ... [Tihe Court's orders are not self-executing. Unless the
Court maintains public esteem, outright defiance by political officials is by no means
unthinkable.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial Essay on the
Wages of/Doctrinal Tension, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1, 17 (2003); cf. United States v. McFarland,
311 F.3d 376, 420 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Jones, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's
failure to explain its rejection of the appellant's Commerce Clause challenge to his convic-
tion, and noting "[t] he court is an institution defined by the reasoned exercise of power").
9. See Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated en bane, 235
F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) Judge Richard Arnold writing for the Eighth Circuit panel do-
clared the local precedent-stripping rule unconstitutional on separation -of- powers grounds.
Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
10. David Greenwald & Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., The Censorial Judiciary, 35 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1133, 1133 (2002).
11. See Jon A. Strongman, Comment, Unpublished Opinions, Precedent, and the Fifth
Amendment: Why Denying Unpublished Opinions Precedential Value Is Unconstitutional,
50 U. KAN. L. REV. 195, 214 (2001).
12. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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federal appellate courts arguably follows from the reasoning in the
Court's prophylactic-rule case law. 13
Importantly, this article is not intended to cavalierly demand a
new prophylactic rule and provide a comprehensive practical
scheme for its administration. Nor will I attempt to catalogue and
retort the numerous arguments (mostly pragmatic) advanced in
response to normative attacks on precedent- stripping; 14 this is
largely because these arguments raise very legitimate practical
concerns that are so serious they deserve special attention in sep-
arate works. Rather, my purpose is much more narrow: I mean to
demonstrate that the offensiveness of precedent -stripping does not
just take the form of classic "rule of law" problems, prudential
conundrums, harm to institutional legitimacy, or unfairness to
litigants who seek to rely on prior unpublished decisions as
precedent. Rather, I highlight new doctrinal angle from which to
argue that an all-out prohibition of precedent- stripping on consti-
tutional grounds can plausibly follow from Supreme Court case
law regardless of per se constitutionality. While such a prophylac-
tic rule would, by definition, apply to state courts as well, I focus
on the federal courts given the relative breadth of data surround-
ing the practice of precedent-stripping in the U.S. circuit courts.
I proceed as follows. Part 11 examines the methods by which
dispositions are stripped of precedential value by the very judges
who write them, and thus become what are often termed "unpub-
lished opinions." Part 11 also discusses the proffered justifications
13. Other authors have attempted to attack prohibitions on citation (as opposed to
precedent stripping per se) of unpublished opinions on procedural due process grounds by
arguing that litigants' traditional ability to invoke prior decisions is somehow essential to
"fundamental fairness." See, e.g., Lance A. Wade, Note, Honda Meets Anastasoff: The
Procedural Due Process Argument Against Rules Prohibiting Citation to Unpublished Judi-
cial Decisions, 42 B.C. L. REV. 695, 714 (2001). These authors seem to assume-
questionably so in this author's view-that fundamental unfairness is manifest in the pro-
hibition-of-citation context, even if the given court is allowed to disregard the cited decision
as non-precedential. In any event, this argument was mooted by the recent promulgation
of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, discussed infra, which allows citation to un-
published opinions. Aside from focusing on precedent- stripping rather than prohibitions on
citation, my argument differs from prior procedural due process arguments in the impor-
tant respect that it focuses on the rights of litigants whose cases are disposed of via non-
precedential opinions, not the rights of those who seek to rely on such opinions subsequent-
ly as precedent. See, e.g., Strongman, supra note 11, at 212. Strongman argues that deny-
ing litigants "the opportunity to rely on the history, the reason, or the course" of a prior
decision denies litigants procedural due process because it allows courts to "arbitrarily
ignore or even directly contradict its previous decision for any reason or no reason at all."
Id.
14. See, e.g., Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J.
177 (1999); Philip Nichols, Jr., Selective Publication of Opinions: One Judge's View, 35 AM.
U. L. REV. 909 (1986).
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for such methods. Part III surveys the available evidence that
courts regularly use precedent-stripping in manners not permitted
by local precedent- stripping rules and discusses how such stealthy
misuse of precedent-stripping works to deny appellants full and
fair adjudication of the issues and arguments presented in their
appeals. Part IV discusses the Supreme Court's formulation of
prophylactic constitutional rules, and the practical exigencies that
inspire their creation, with a focus on Miranda. Part V then pro-
poses that, given the evidence of widespread misuse of precedent-
stripping, and given the practical difficulty litigants face in prov-
ing such misuse in individual cases, the logic of Miranda and oth-
er prophylactic- rule case law supports the creation of a prophylac-
tic rule prohibiting precedent- stripping.
11. "THE ROAD To HELL IS PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS": How
AND WHY JUDGES ARE ABLE TO STRIP THEIR OWN OPINIONS OF
PRECEDENTIAL STATUS
During the 1950s and 1960s the federal courts saw, and fore-
saw, a daunting growth in their dockets without a corresponding
rise in available resources. 1 5 Bound case reporters were balloon-
ing such that many feared that absent some reform in the publica-
tion of judicial opinions, the sheer volume of precedent would
make it increasingly impracticable for lawyers and judges to iden-
tify opinions to serve as primary authority in future cases. 16
To deal with this problem, the Judicial Conference of the United
States in 1964 declared that the federal appellate courts should
publish-and therefore make precedential-only those opinions
that were "of general precedential value."17 The Advisory Council
for Appellate Justice (ACAJ) provided guidelines to the circuits for
the promulgation of local selective publication rules. The ACAJ
urged that, in deciding whether to publish an opinion, courts
should consider factors such as whether the decision created a
new rule of law, altered an existing one, or resolved some conflict
of authority.18 The resulting local rules track this standard. 19
15. William Reynolds & William Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication
and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1167-68
(1978)
16. Id.
17. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (1964) [hereinafter "JC REPORT"].
18. See id. at 15.17.
19. For example, see 4th Cir. R. 36(a), which provides:
Vol. 48564
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Given the growth in dockets since the 1960s, the proportion of
cases disposed of via non-precedential dispositions has sharply
increased. According to the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts, 81.8% of federal appellate court opinions went "unpub-
lished" in 2008,20 meaning that a vast majority of opinions issued
by the federal appellate courts in 2008 were deemed inappropriate
for use as precedent purportedly on the basis that they
represented perfunctory application of well-settled rules in con-
texts where the proper application of those rules indisputably al-
lowed only for the result reached. To put it yet another way, in
theory, 81.8% of 2008 federal appellate dispositions offered abso-
lutely nothing new to practitioners, nor did the outcomes reflect
any meaningful evolution-no matter how slight-of the respec-
tive law. To help ensure that future panels did not consult them
in deciding future cases, precedent-stripping rules, until recently,
forbade attorneys from even citing unpublished opinions. 2'
Perhaps due to the steady drumbeat of calls for courts to allow
citation to unpublished opinions at least as persuasive authority,
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 was recently promulgat-
ed; it abrogates all local circuit rules insofar as they prohibit cita-
tion of unpublished opinions issued after January 1, 2007.22 How-
Opinions delivered by the Court will be published only if the opinion satisfies one or
more of the standards for publication:
1. It establishes, alters, modifies, clarifies, or explains a rule of law within this
Circuit; or
ii. It involves a legal issue of continuing public interest; or
iii. It criticizes existing law; or
iv. It contains a historical review of a legal rule that is not duplicative; or
V. It resolves a conflict between panels of this Court, or creates a conflict with a
decision in another circuit.
Id.
20. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR:
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, tbl. S-3 (2009).
21. For example, see Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155. 1159 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Unpub-
lished dispositions and orders of this Court are not binding precedent . .. [and generally]
may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit ... "(quoting former 9th Cir. R. 36-3)).
22. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1. The new Rule provides:
Citation Permitted. A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal judi-
cial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been:
(i) designated as "unpublished," "not for publication," "non- precedential," "not
precedent," or the like; and
(ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007.
Copies Required. If a party cites a federal judicial opinion, order, judgment, or other
written disposition that is not available in a publicly accessible electronic database,
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ever, Rule 32.1 leaves undisturbed courts' ability to strip their
own opinions of precedential effect, thus failing to resolve what is
in this author's vriew the most serious problem with "non-
publication."
That precedent-stripping raises serious concerns should be ob-
vious upon a cursory reflection on the very nature of the rules
sanctioning the practice. Why would a court need to formally and
affirmatively strip a disposition of precedential status if it truly
offers nothing new? If there is a published opinion on point, one
that makes the given proposition at least equally clear, would not
an attorney seek out the published opinion representing the given
proposition (and likely providing greater rhetorical ammunition
given the relative brevity of unpublished opinions)? Attorneys do
not cite unpublished opinions unless it helps their case to do So. 2 3
Any follower of the federal courts knows that unpublished disposi-
tions often do work qualifications, clarifications, or refinements of
the respective legal principles, even if so subtle when made (yet
subsequently meaningful to litigants) so as to escape the foresight
of the authoring judges.24 Indeed, because the very promulgation
the party must file and serve a copy of that opinion, order, judgment, or disposition
with the brief or other paper in which it is cited.
Id.
23. See Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 256 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2001)
(Smith, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe justification for unpublished opinions-that, as a matter of
efficiency, the court should not publish redundant opinions-provides no support for the
proposition that such opinions should carry no precedential weight. If the opinion is a mere
restatement of existing law (as it must he, if it is accorded unpublished status), what is the
harm in viewing it as precedent?"); In re Rules of United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, Adopted Nov. 18, 1986, 955 F.2d 36, 38 (10th Cir. 1992) (Holloway, J., dis-
senting). Judge Holloway dissented from the adoption of a circuit rule barring citation of
unpublished opinions:
[Piroponents of the no-citation rule argue that many of the court's rulings are not
significant precedents and are in fact essentially decisions on factual issues only, or
are merely applications of clearly established legal principles not meriting publica-
tion or citation. This suggestion is wholly unpersuasive to me. If this were truly the
case, considerations of efficiency and economy would lead counsel to rely on published
decisions, rather than dig for unpublished rulings, and we would not need a no-
citation rule.
Rules, 955 F.2d at 38 (emphasis added). See also Gideon Kanner, The Unpublished Appel-
late Opinion: Friend or Foe?, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 386, 446 n.75 (1973) ("[Wlhy would any law-
yer in his right mind go to the trouble of finding and citing unpublished opinions which
merely reiterate rules and rely on precedents already larding the published reports?").
24. The clich6 that "[s~tare decisis is not an inexorable command" but rather a creature
of prudence is of little relevance here. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991); see
also Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-06 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing). In most of the federal circuits, when a panel opinion is precedential, it becomes the
"law of the circuit" and is thus controlling in future like cases within that circuit. See, e.g.,
Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Troyer, 479 F.3d 1269, 1292 (10th Cir. 2007) (McConnell, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) ("[Alssuming arguendo that these two precedents di-
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of Rule 31.2 represents an acquiescence to voices within the pro-
fession calling for the end of citation prohibitions, it is difficult to
imagine any other impetus to the rule other than the perceived
value of unpublished opinions to the bar. As Ninth Circuit Judge
Alex Kozinski has noted in answering demands by the Ninth Cir-
cuit bar to allow citation to unpublished opinions (before the
promulgation of Rule 31.2), "At bench and bar meetings, lawyers
complain at length about being denied this fertile source of au-
thority."125
Although amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure allow citation to non-precedential dispositions, courts are
now as free as ever to deny their opinions precedential status, and
nothing exists to ensure that judges do not employ precedent-
stripping for purposes not expressly sanctioned by the respective
rules. In this regard, evidence strongly suggests that courts regu-
larly use precedent- stripping as a means of truncating the adjudi-
cation of appeals, rather than merely truncating the opinions that
announce outcomes; of course, precedent-stripping rules contem-
plate only the latter. This evidence is a topic to which I now turn.
111. EVIDENCE OF SYSTEMIC MISUSE OF PRECEDENT-STRIPPING
RULES
The federal appellate courts are exceedingly insular. While
most lawyers believe that federal judges' constitutionally granted
immunity from transient public passions yields a net gain, life
tenure and a protective mystique can erode the healthy self-
consciousness that is often the most powerful force disciplining
public servants. So little direct evidence of "how the sausage is
rectly conflict, we are obliged to follow the ruling of the earlier panel ... ); Burke-Fowler
v. Orange County, 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 n.2 (11th Cir. 2006) ("[Wlhen a later panel decision
contradicts an earlier one, the earlier panel decision controls."); Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. City of
El Paso, 243 F.3d 936, 940 (5th Cir. 2001) ("When two holdings or lines of precedent con-
flict, the earlier holding or line of precedent controls."); Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224
F.3d 806, 822 (6th Cir. 2000) ("[WMe must defer to a prior case when two panel decisions
conflict."); Ryan v. Johnson, 115 F.3d 193, 198 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Under Third Circuit Internal
Operating Procedure 9.1, when two decisions of this court conflict, we are bound by the
earlier decision."); Newell Cos., Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
("This court has adopted the rule that prior decisions of a panel of the court are binding
precedent on subsequent panels unless and until overturned [e]n banc. Where there is
direct conflict, the precedential decision is the first."); McMellon v. United States, 387 F.3d
329, 333 (4th Cir. 2004); but see Graham v. Contract Transp., Inc., 220 F.3d 910, 914 (8th
Cir. 2000) ("When faced with conflicting [intra-circuit] precedents we are free to choose
which line of cases to follow.").
25. Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don't Cite This! Why We Don't Allow
Citation to Unpublished Decisions, CAL. LAWYER, June 2000, at 43.
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made" in specific cases is available to the public. Thus, examining
the frequency of misuse of precedent- stripping invariably involves
inferences about intentions. But this is not as much of an inexact
science as it may initially seem, as empirical study sometimes
yields premises that support only one plausible conclusion.
For example, David Law conducted a statistical analysis of
Ninth Circuit dispositions of asylum appeals between 1992 and
2001 in order to test the hypothesis that "the decision to publish is
influenced by judicial ideology." 26 After exhaustive study, Law
concluded:
[T]here exists, for some judges, a significant relationship be-
tween how the judge votes on the merits of the case, and
whether the case is published: publication increases the like-
lihood that certain judges vote in favor of asylum. The results
suggest that voting and publication are, for some judges, stra-
tegically intertwined: for example, judges may be prepared to
acquiesce in decisions that run contrary to their own prefe-
rences, and to vote with the majority, as long as the decision
remains unpublished, but can be driven to dissent if the ma-
jority insists upon publication.27
Law further concluded that "[i]deology influences judicial voting in
unpublished cases":
Majority-Democratic panels were significantly more likely
than majority-Republican panels to grant some form of relief
to asylum seekers. Moreover, this difference was pronounced
in both published and unpublished cases. With respect to un-
published cases, majority-Democratic panels granted relief
20.5% of the time, while majority-Republican panels did so
just 7.5% of the time. In other words, Democratic panels were
2.7 times more likely than Republican panels to rule in favor
of the asylum seeker.281
Regarding cases involving law so settled such that its operation
in a case is not open to reasoned debate (the theoretical descrip-
tion of cases stripped of precedential value) liberal and conserva-
tive judges should not differ in their conclusions this frequently, if
26. David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum
Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817, 820 (2005).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 843.
568 Vol. 48
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at all. Although one need not be a dyed-in-the-wool legal realist to
recognize that judges' ideologies often inform their jurisprudence,
in cases where outcomes are truly undebatable, examples of
judges disagreeing on outcomes based on ideology are rare, pri-
marily because most judges recognize the obvious impropriety of
literally ignoring directly on-point and controlling authority.
Thus, if we assume a minimum amount of integrity and compe-
tence on the part of Ninth Circuit judges-as I think we should-
the most reasonable conclusion based on Law's analysis is that
many asylum appeals disposed of via non-precedential disposi-
tions are arguable on the merits such that their outcomes, if pub-
lished, would work a refinement or clarification of governing law. 29
Donald Songer, Dana Smith, and Reginald S. Sheehan in their
study coded hundreds of Eleventh Circuit opinions for statistical
analysis in order to determine whether judges' decisions to publish
were consistent with the written non-publication local rule.30 Ac-
cording to the authors, "criteria [for using precedent- stripping
rules] are not . . . applied in all instances and concomitantly there
are many controversial cases that are ending up [disposed of] in
unpublished decisions."31 The authors observed that, in cases dis-
posed of through unpublished dispositions, "panels dominated by
Democratic judges were liberal in 28.7% of their decisions, while
Republican- dominated panels were liberal in only 8.7% of their
decisions"; the authors thus concluded that "ideology is a factor in
at least 20% of the decisions that result in . .. unpublished opi-
nions."32
Other statistical data is available. According to Lauren Robel,
30% of federal judges admitted in a survey that they sometimes
forwent drafting published opinions for cases in which they knew
published opinions "should be written."33 One federal appellate
judge has admitted that "[uln our circuit, staff attorneys prepare
29. Law also demonstrated how a panel's political-party make-up is a "highly signifi-
cant predictorfj of how unpublished asylum cases were decided." Id. at 847. An asylum
seeker had a 4% chance of victory on appeal with an all-Republican panel. Id. The pres-
ence of one Democrat raises his chances to 12%, with two Democrats, 20%, and with an all-
Democratic panel, 30%. Id. at 848.
30. See Donald R. Songer et al., Nonpublication in the Eleventh Circuit: An Empirical
Analysis, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 963, 976-77 (1989).
31. Id. at 976.
32. Id. at 977.
33. Lauren Robel, The Practice of Precedent: Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, and the
Meaning of Precedent in an Interpretive Community, 35 IND. L. REV. 399, 403 (2002) (quot-
ing 2 FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., WORKING PAPERS AND SUBcommiTTEE REPORTS 87
(1990)).
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routine drafts that judges approve but do not research or write...
These definitely should not be available for citation.134 Similarly,
a study of the federal courts during 1978-79 revealed that one out
of every seven unpublished dispositions in the federal appellate
courts resulted in reversals,35 and in 2000, the rate rose to one in
every 4.7.36 That is, in 2000, in one out of every 4.7 cases in which
the operation of the respective law was allegedly perfectly clear,
the respective district judge applied the law incorrectly and re-
versibly erred in doing so. That reversal results this frequently is
significant because minor district court errors that manifest no
harm to appellants are generally ignored on appeal as "harmless
errors," and are therefore not adequate bases for reversal. For
example, in the Fifth Circuit, district court "abuses of discretion"
warrant reversal only if, pursuant to the "harmless error doc-
trine," "a substantial right of the complaining party was af-
fected." 37 "An error affects substantial rights if it affects the out-
come of the trial proceedings."38 Thus, the more than one out of
five unpublished dispositions announcing reversals in 2000
represented significant legal errors by the respective district
judges.39 Either district judges frequently and blatantly ignored
well-established and perfectly clear precedent in those cases, or
the operation of precedent was not clear in many of them.
Thus unsurprising is Sixth Circuit Judge Danny Boggs's asser-
tion that the "theory often advanced to explain unpublished opi-
nions"-that is, the matters disposed of via unpublished opinions
are "easy cases that are clearly dictated by existing precedent"-
34. ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, CITING UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS IN FEDERAL APPEALS 70
(2003), available at http://www.fie.gov/public/pdf.nsfflookup/citatio3.pdf/$file/citatio3.pdf
(emphasis added) (quoting response J7-6).
35. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication
in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 617
(1981).
36. Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States
Courts of Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 199, 216 (200 1).
37. Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 265 (5th Cir. 2007).
38. United States v. Mejia-Huerta, 480 F.3d 713, 720 (5th Cir. 2007).
39. Of course, some of these reversals are appropriate for summary disposition. For
example, in Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the Supreme Court announced a
new rule governing application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines; the new rule applied
not only to future criminal sentences but also sentences against which challenges were then
pending in the federal appellate courts. Thus, the appellate courts subsequently remanded
many cases to district courts for resentencing in compliance with Booker. These are true
perfunctory remands, where all that is needed is a citation to the intervening change in
law. These types of dispositions likely represent a small portion of the unpublished disposi-
tions during 2000, and thus cannot explain away the reversal rate in unpublished disposi-





"is self-evidently wrong for both empirical and theoretical reasons.
As an empirical matter, plenty of unpublished decisions have been
accepted for review and reversed by the Supreme Court." 40 Judge
Boggs continued, explaining:
Even if all that is meant by "easy cases" is that some cases
are clearly dictated by precedent within a particular circuit at
the time a case is decided (without regard to circuit splits or
other facts that might cause the Supreme Court to review and
possibly reverse a decision clearly dictated by circuit law at
the time), the "easy cases" rationale is still faulty on empirical
grounds. Consider the number of unpublished opinions that
involve lengthy dissents.41
On this note, Deborah Jones Merritt and James J. Brudney
have published the results of their statistical analysis of the 1,224
unfair labor practices cases the federal appellate courts disposed
of between 1986 and 1993.42 They found that the non-precedential
opinions studied "included a surprising number of reversals, dis-
sents, and concurrences." 43 They also concluded:
Democratic judges were significantly more likely than their
Republican colleagues to support the union in these unpub-
lished cases. Judges who had held elected office or served as
full-time academics were also more likely to vote for the un-
ion. Conversely, judges with prior judicial experience, as well
as Latino and Asian judges, were significantly less likely to
support the union.44
Merritt and Brudney thus concluded that:
[Planels authoring unpublished opinions reach some results
with which other reasonable judges would disagree. Such di-
vergent views are likely to reflect both differences as to the
meaning of legal principles and disagreement over the proper
application of seemingly settled law. Under those circums-
tances, failing to give unpublished opinions precedential effect
raises the very specter ... that like cases will be decided in
40. Danny J. Boggs & Brian P. Brooks, Unpublished Opinions & the Nature of
Precedent, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 17, 20-2 1 (2000).
41. Id. at 21.
42. Merritt & Brudney, supra note 6.
43. Id. at 113.
44. Id. at 109.
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unlike ways, that judges' decisions will be regulated only by
their own (personal) opinions .. . .4
Sarah Ricks studied the Third Circuit's case law on the "state-
created danger" doctrine relating to substantive due process. She
studied both precedential and non-precedential opinions over a
period of seven years and concluded that "the doctrinal inconsis-
tencies between the Third Circuit's precedential and non-
precedential state-created danger opinions created a layer of hie-
rarchical decision-making" that undermines "the appellate func-
tions of ensuring that like cases are treated alike, [and] of ensur-
ing that judicial decisions are predictable and not arbitrary."
46
A vast body of anecdotal evidence reinforces the empirical data.
On more than one occasion federal judges have expressly voiced
their disdain over misuse of precedent-stripping rules. As a ran-
dom example among many, consider a dissent from Fifth Circuit
Judge Jerry Smith, in which he urged his colleagues to reconsider
the policy of refusing to lend precedential value to unpublished
dispositions.47 Judge Smith noted that although "theoretically,
because an unpublished case does nothing new, an older case easi-
ly can be cited for the same proposition, . . . there are opinions
that, though unpublished, do establish a new rule of law or apply
existing law to distinct facts."4 8 Judge Smith continued, citing
"[e] mpirical evidence" suggesting that such cases "are more com-
mon than one might think."149
Richard Posner, Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit, has as-
serted that non-precedential opinions are a "sort of a formula for
irresponsibility," and has admitted that "[miost judges, myself in-
cluded, are not nearly as careful in dealing with unpublished deci-
sions."50 That a judge so familiar with the workings of the federal
courts, with vast experience within them, and with such familiari-
ty with the jurisprudential issues the federal courts face, would
45. Id. at 119 (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. Sarah E. Ricks, The Perils of Unpublished Non-Precedential Federal Appellate
Opinions: A Case Study of the Substantive Due Process State-Created Danger Doctrine in
One Circuit, 81 WASH. L. REV. 217, 222 (2006).
47. Williams, 256 F.3d at 260 (Smith, J.,dissenting).
48. Id. at 26 1-62.
49. Id. at 262.
50. Glaberson, supra note 8. Though, it should he noted, Posner has little sympathy for
arguments attacking the former non-citation and current depublication rules. See generally
Letter from Richard A. Posner et al., to Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Comm. on




confidently assert that "most judges" give non-precedential dispo-
sitions less care is quite damning. Consider further an article by
Patricia Wald, former Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit, wherein she
laments the gradual advent of "a double-track system [that] allows
for deviousness and abuse":5 '
I have seen judges purposely compromise on an unpublished
decision incorporating an agreed-upon result in order to avoid
a time-consuming public debate about what law controls. I
have even seen wily would-be dissenters go along with a re-
sult they do not like so long as it is not elevated to a
precedent. We do occasionally sweep troublesome issues un-
der the rug. . ... [The common absence of meaningful rhetoric
in] unpublished decisions signifies that they are the product
of a different and much-abbreviated decision-making
process.52
Judge Wald also raised the issue with her colleagues in her con-
curring opinion in National Classification Committee v. United
States:
I want ... to express my concerns about the manner in which
No. 83-1866 was decided. In my view, it did not present the
type of case appropriate for disposition without a published
opinion. Indeed, the present case testifies to the unfortunate
by-products of the overuse of this rapidly growing mode of
disposition. Although the heavy caseload in this court neces-
sitates the disposition of a large percentage of cases by order
or short unpublished memorandum opinions, serious ques-
tions continue to be raised about the circumstances in which
it is appropriate for this court to dispose of cases in such a
truncated manner. 53
As another example, Judge Richard Arnold, former Chief Judge
of the Eighth Circuit and one of the most vociferous opponents of
precedent-stripping on the federal bench, has asserted that use of
51. Wald, supra note 5, at 1374.
52. Id. at 1374-75. Judge Wald also notes: "One of our most prominent judges a few
years ago authored twenty-three published opinions and thirty-one unpublished opinions
for the court, while an equally distinguished colleague authored thirty-four published and
only three unpublished opinions. All judges on our court sit on the same number of cases
annually." Id. at 1376.
53. 765 F.2d 164, 172-73 (D.C. cir. 1985) (W~ald, J., concurring).
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precedent- stripping has created "a vast underground body of law
*.disavowed by the very judges who are producing it":
Mli]any cases with obvious legal importance are being decided
by unpublished opinions. Some unpublished opinions-and, I
must say, I believe this occurs more in other circuits than in
the Eighth-are fairly elaborate. They go for as long as twen-
ty pages. They contain citations and legal reasoning. Occa-
sionally they decide questions that anyone would describe as
important. 54
Judge Arnold goes further; although he disclaims witnessing ac-
tual misuse by his colleagues, he seems to acknowledge it when he
states:
If, for example, a precedent is cited, and the other side then
offers a distinction, and the judges on the panel cannot think
of a good answer to the distinction, but nevertheless, for some
extraneous reason, wish to reject it, they can easily do so
through the device of an abbreviated, unpublished opinion,
and no one will ever be the wiser. . .. Or if, after hearing ar-
gument, a judge in conference thinks th~a]t a certain decision
should be reached, but also believes that the decision is hard
to justify under the law, he or she can achieve the result, as-
suming agreement by the other members of the panel, by de-
ciding the case in an unpublished opinion and sweeping the
difficulties under the rug.55
Other judges have written about the tendency for some col-
leagues to use precedent- stripping as a means of disposing of ap-
peals without having to commit to the reasoning inspiring their
decision as "the law" on the issue, lest they face the prospect of en
banc vacatur, Supreme Court reversal, frustration from circuit
colleagues (who for obvious reasons pay most attention to newly
issued binding opinions) or just feel more comfortable deferring
adjudication of an issue of first impression for another day. As
Judge Boggs has noted:
54. Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, I J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
219, 224, 226 (1999). Incidentally, Judge Arnold authored one of the few opinions directly
addressing the constitutionality of precedent -stripping. See Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899
(declaring the Eighth Circuit's local precedent-stripping rule unconstitutional on separa-
tion-of-powers grounds).
55. Arnold, supra note 54, at 223.
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Because [en banc or Supreme Court] review of panel decisions
usually is limited to decisions that present the need for estab-
lishment of an authoritative rule-perhaps where there has
been a conflict among prior decisions, or where the issue in-
volved is of particular public significance-it is left to the pa-
nels themselves to protect against the possibility of ordinary
error. One way to do this is to enter rule-setting decisions on
an unpublished basis, thus permitting the question at issue to
continue to "percolate" in the circuit before adopting a final,
authoritative rule.5 6
On this note, Judge Wald speculates that inappropriate use of
non-precedential disposition arises when "overworked judges [are]
seduced too easily into preferring the easier, nonrhetorical route,
especially in close cases."57
Misuse of precedent- stripping rules has become so common such
that federal judges openly admit to using them for purposes not
endorsed by the respective rules. Consider Ninth Circuit Judge
Alex Kozinski's statement before Congress, made in defense of
noncitation rules: "[W]hile three judges might all agree on the
outcome of the case before them, they might not agree on the pre-
cise reasoning or the rule that would be binding in future cases if
the decision were published."58 According to Judge Koziriski, even
though language in unpublished opinions may inadvertently imply
56. Boggs & Brooks, supra note 40, at 24 n.28. That a judge may want to let an issue
"percolate" is not in itself an ethical indictment. There are certainly understandable rea-
sons for this; for example, if the advocacy in a case presenting a novel issue is so poor such
that the arguments and authority presented are of little assistance in aiding the court in
reaching a conclusion sufficiently vetted to serve as precedent-as is often the case in pro
se appeals-a judge might believe it is the lesser evil to not contaminate the reporters with
bad precedent, but rather defer making new law to a time when the court is more compe-
tent to do so. Cf. REAGAN, supra note 34, at 75 ("Allowing citation of these decisions would .
. . suggest that the court has reached considered decisions on particular issues when in fact
thnt is not often true." (quoting Judge JF-2)). The problem is, the relevant rules do not
contemplate such a reason as a valid basis for precedent -stripping. Further, this reasoning
"1proves too much." Consider that essentially all collateral attacks (post-conviction habeas
corpus petitions) are brought by pro se prisoners. Prisoners are able to bring them because
Congress has decided to give them a right to do so. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006). The above
reasoning in favor of "percolation," if sound, would mean that courts could indefinitely forgo
definitive adjudication of important issues presented in habeas corpus petitions. If such is
true, it is difficult to imagine how many appellants would have their rights affected by
decisions the correctness of which commands so little confidence by the very judges who
issue them.
57. Wald, supra note 5, at 1376 (emphasis added).
58. Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts, The
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the [House] Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 34 (2002) (prepared statement of Alex Kozinski) [hereinafter "House Hearing"].
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(notwithstanding being cursory) certain premises or reasoning,
such reasoning is not fairly attributable to the entire panel, and
therefore attorneys should not be permitted to rely on such lan-
guage as statements of circuit law in future cases.
Judge Kozinski's remarks unselfconsciously ignore the fact that
the Ninth Circuit rule in effect at the time, Rule 36-2, did not list
this rationale as a valid basis for precedent- stripping. And of
course, if three panel members cannot agree on the operation of
controlling law in a given case, it is likely that a definitive state-
ment of law, if negotiated between the judges as their judicial rule
contemplates, would refine or clarify the relevant law. Therefore,
the theoretical justification for non-publication is absent in these
cases. 59
Hearsay and anecdotal evidence consistent with the above is
abundant. For example, Professor Pether notes:
One colleague tells me that on the federal court on which he
clerked, decisions about whether opinions should be published
often turned on which clerk was perceived to need an opinion
of his/her authorship published for future employment pur-
poses. There are also anecdotal accounts of judges "punish-
ing" repeat-player litigants and lawyers for whom they are le-
gally obliged to rule against their inclination, by not publish-
ing the relevant opinion so it will not be available as
precedent in future litigation. Unsurprisingly, no public
record of such behavior exists. 60
David Law has asserted his belief, based on his "own observations
as a law clerk on the Ninth Circuit," that "circuit judges prefer to
publish decisions they favor on ideological grounds."16'
59. Aside from this, Judge Kozmnski's remarks beg the question of why the hypothetical
trio's failure to agree on reasoning warrants silence. If anything, it seems to warrant the
opposite given courts' institutional role. See McFarland, 311 F.3d at 420 ("Judges often
express different reasons for reaching a single result. In fact, the best test of competing
legal theories is in the open marketplace of ideas. Silence, therefore, could mean unwil-
lingness to compete."); see also County of Los Angeles v. Kling, 474 U.S. 936, 940 n.6 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting from the Court's summary reversal of appellate decision) ("If I can-
not give reason I should be willing to stand to, I must shrink from the very result which
otherwise seems good."); McFarland, 311 F.3d at 417 ("Federal appellate courts' twin duties
are to decide appeals and articulate the law.").
60. Pether, supra note 4, at 1487-885.
61. See Law, supra note 26, at 837-38. See also Paul Marcotte, Unpublished but In-
fluential, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1991, at 28 ('Law clerks told [law professor Lauren] Robel that
judges sometimes would agree not to dissent if an opinion remained unpublished.").
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Compounding the problem of general inappropriate use of
precedent-stripping is the fact that certain classes of cases are
disproportionally disposed of through non-precedential disposi-
tions, thus raising suspicions that courts regularly treat pro se or
criminal appellants as second-class litigants. In proposing "peri-
odic overviews of which kinds of cases get sent down one track ra-
ther than another," Judge Wald has noted:
Danger signals include the presence of obviously difficult is-
sues or the predominance of certain kinds of cases (for exam-
ple section 1983 prisoner cases) on one track, inconsistencies
between published and unpublished results and rationales.
and widely differing rates of published and unpublished opi-
nions among different judges.62
Ninth Circuit Judge Margaret McKeown has described this re-
legation of certain types of cases as constituting a "private history"
of precedent-stripping:
Judge McKeown's thesis was that the development of contem-
porary unpublication derived not only from the overt cause,
the difficulties of indexing law libraries because of the volume
of opinions issuing from the federal courts, but from the fed-
eral judiciary's anxiety about floods of civil rights and pro se
prisoner postconviction appeals litigation in the 1960s.6 3
Edith Jones, currently Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit, has stated
that in deciding whether a case will be disposed of via an unpub-
lished opinion, or whether it will be handled primarily by non-
Article III court personnel such as staff attorneys, the court con-
siders "criteria as whether they were filed pro se or whether they
present 'routine,' as opposed to novel, issues."6 4 A former Chief
Judge of the Fourth Circuit has noted that "[niow no postconvic-
tion case gets on our regular hearing calendar unless at least one
judge is of the opinion that a full hearing would be of assistance in
its disposition." 6 5 A Ninth Circuit judge has noted, in response to
questions about the so-called "screening" category of cases-
essentially, cases tracked for summary disposition-that "we lack
62. Wald, supra note 5, at 1376.
63. Pether, supra note 4, at 1444-45.
64. Edith H. Jones, Back to the Future for Federal Appeals Courts: Rationing Federal
Justice by Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1485, 1492 (1995) (hook review)
(emphasis added).
65. Jones v. Superintendent, Va. State Farm, 465 F.2d 1091, 1095 (4th Cir. 1972).
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the resources to give 10,000 dispositions the same attention and
scrutiny as precedential opinions must have."6 6 Thus, in some
courts certain classes of cases are categorically presumed to be
frivolous unless an overworked judge, understandably distracted
by many other complicated cases, happens to notice an issue war-
ranting traditional adjudication. 67
Some argue that this "double -track" system of justice is the re-
sult of judges weighing the importance of cases based on the mon-
etary value implicated. 68 Others urge that this advent of a "two-
track system" of justice is due partly to court culture wherein an
aura of intellectual gravitas surrounds the doctrinal "big picture"
issues often inhering in civil cases. The implication being that
among judges and clerks, "law nerd" is a badge of honor, and
judges or (more often) their clerks rarely waste opportunities to
demonstrate their bookishness bona fides by approaching the most
arcane doctrinal issues with seeming passion. In civil non-pro se
cases, the lawyers tend to be the more celebrated members of the
bar (while public defenders, perhaps unfairly, are often not) and,
because they get paid incredible hourly rates to do so, they tend to
raise the most novel, creative, and refined legal arguments. Thus,
as Penelope Pether discusses, work on civil appeals often provides
a greater degree of professional satisfaction to judges and law
clerks, and criminal or pro se matters quickly gain the reputation
of being routine, unchallenging, and boring.69
To be sure, that certain classes of cases are disproportionately
disposed of via non-precedential opinions is not surprising, nor is
it in itself evidence of systemic elitism or unfairness. Chief Judge
Jones is correct when she notes that the dockets of the federal ap-
66. REAGAN, supra note 34, at 74 (quoting Judge J9-25).
67. This is another feature of current appellate court practice that has received main-
stream press attention. See Glaberson, supra note 8 ("In one of the most controversial
changes, the appeals courts created new staff lawyer positions, permanent employees with
the authority to screen and, some critics say, to effectively decide thousands of cases by
giving judges brief summaries of recommended decisions.").
68. William Richman and William Reynolds argue:
"[Tlhe transformation has created different tracks of justice for different cases and
different litigants: important cases (usually measured by monetary value) and po-
werful litigants receive greater judicial attention than less important cases and
weaker litigants. At one end of the spectrum, perhaps in a major securities case, the
judges play a very active role: they listen to oral argument, work hard preparing opi-
nions which are circulated among and read carefully by their colleagues, and ulti-
mately have the final opinion published in the Federal Reporter as a precedent. A
stark contrast exists at the other end of the spectrum."
William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari:
Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 275 (1996).
69. Pether, supra note 4, at 1438-39.
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pellate courts have been "dumbed down," to use her words, by pa-
tently frivolous arguments, brought largely from pro se appel-
lants.70 These are often prisoners who have nothing better to do
with their time but to bring successive and grossly meritless ar-
guments, and in the process bog down administration of the feder-
al courts. The concern, however, is that judges' sensitivity to this
reality, and need to deal with it, has given rise to a system where-
by certain types of appeals are presumed to be meritless, and are
disposed of based on such a presumption without the full consid-
eration and research conducted for other appeals. In this sense,
cases in which courts knowingly use precedent- stripping as a
means to forgo the deliberation and research required to thorough-
ly adjudicate an appeal may be the tip of the iceberg.
The base of the iceberg may be cases wherein appellants suffer
summary disposition of their arguments because judges perhaps
negligently, i.e., unconscientiously but not intentionally, assume
such cases are utterly routine. Scholars and judges have repeat-
edly noted how the process of opinion writing is more than just
perfunctory memorialization of premises firmly established in the
mind, and reasoning fully evolved and vetted, prior to the grasp of
pen. Rather, opinion writing is often part of the process of adjudi-
cation itself rather than a mere vehicle for its announcement. As
Lauren Robel notes, "[Many judges have noted how frequently a
case's complexities are revealed through the process of writing an
opinion."71 For example, Judge Wald explains:
Even when judges agree on a proposed result after reading
briefs and hearing arguments, the true test comes when the
writing judge reasons it out on paper (or on computer). That
process, more than the vote at conference or the courtroom di-
alogue, puts the writer on the line, reminds her with each tap
of the key that she will be held responsible for the logic and
persuasiveness of the reasoning and its implications for the
larger body of circuit or national law. Most judges feel that
responsibility keenly; they literally agonize over their pub-
lished opinions, which sometimes take weeks or even months
to bring to term. It is not so unusual to modulate, transfer, or
70. Jones, supra note 64, at 1493-94.
71. Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of Disposable Opinions & Government Litigants in the
United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940, 954 (1989). See also Richman &
Reynolds, supra note 68, at 284 ("writing out an opinion helps the author to understand
the prohlem, to see things she otherwise would not see.").
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even switch an originally intended rationale or result in mid-
stream because "it just won't write." But writing to explain a
preordained result with no concern for its precedential effect
under a self-imposed time constraint of hours is something
else entirely, inviting no backward looks or self-doubt. Rhe-
toric will always be tied to import and permanence, and its
absence in unpublished decisions signifies that they are the
product of a different and much- abbreviated decision-making
process. 72
Chief Judge Jones has expressed this same sentiment: "[Tjhe
necessity of stating reasons not infrequently changes the results
by forcing the judges to come to grips with nettlesome facts or is-
sues which their normal instincts would otherwise cause them to
avoid." 73
Further, in his aforementioned 2002 statement before Congress,
Judge Kozinski stated in his attempt to defend precedent-
stripping:
[Writing opinions is a] very difficult and delicate business in-
deed .... While an unpublished disposition can often be pre-
pared in only a few hours, an opinion generally takes many
days (often weeks, sometimes months) of drafting, editing, po-
lishing and revising. Frequently, this process brings to light
new issues, calling for further research, which may sometimes
send the author all the way back to square one.74
In their unselfconsciousness, Judge Kozinski's comments, made in
an attempt to actually rationalize the use of precedent -stripping
rules, are quite revealing. In the balance of his statement, Judge
Kozinski generally chooses his words carefully, attempting to ex-
plain how judges' use of precedent- stripping yields greater effi-
ciency and prevents harm to the bar. According to Judge Kozins-
ki, by enabling judges to forgo careful expression of their reason-
ing, non-precedential dispositions allow adjudication of the respec-
tive appeal without the confusion or appearance of contradiction
72. Wald, supra note 5, at 1374-75.
73. McFarland, 311 F.3d at 417 (quoting PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET. AL., JUSTICE ON
APPEAL 10 (1976)). See also Nichols, supra note 14, at 915. Judge Nichols noted that
"judges are quoted as saying that they sometimes start on opinions that 'will not write'
and the difficulty in putting it on paper is finally realized to be due to a weakness in the
decision itself, as tentatively arrived at after oral argument. I have experienced this, other
judges say they have, and there can be no doubt it occurs." Id. (footnote omitted).
74. House Hearing, supra note 58, at 12.
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that might result were less carefully crafted opinions made prece-
dential. As he puts it, "If unpublished dispositions could be cited
as precedent, conscientious judges would have to pay much closer
attention to their precise wording. Language [as opposed to rea-
soning or principles] that might be adequate when applied to a
particular case might well be unacceptable if applied to future
cases raising different fact patterns.175
But Judge Kozinski undermines his own implicit (but crucial)
premise-that non-precedential dispositions represent only the
absence of precise language rather than thorough analysis or re-
search-by unwittingly conceding that the continuing evolution of
analysis that characterizes opinion writing often meaningfully
effects the application of the law, bringing to "light new issues,"
"calling for further research," and, most importantly, "sending the
author back to square one," which Chief Judge Jones agrees some-
times means a change in result. 76
A corollary of Judge Kozinki's remarks, which are reinforced by
what other judges (and the law clerks that assist them) acknowl-
edge, is that opinion writing is an organic contemplative process
rather than one of mere after-the-fact recitation. It is part of the
process of adjudication in that the process of drafting, and the
reaching of panel consensus 77 on a final precedential version, in-
volves deep consideration of the future implications of, or the ana-
lytical soundness of, what is written. These considerations are all
a part of establishing "what the law is," and they have long been
considered legitimate-indeed, necessary-parts of the adjudica-
tive process (see the ubiquitous "policy" questions on law school
exams). They ensure that the principle expounded or applied in a
given case is one that encompasses "justice" in the various senses
of the term: balancing the public interest, textual fidelity, ade-
quate incorporation of prudential doctrines, legislative intent, and
vindication of the given litigant's rights in a manner that most
maintains the stability, predictability, and integrity of the law and
75. Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
76. Kozmnski & Reinhardt, supra note 25, at 43.
77. As Judge Kozinski notes, the process of hammering out a published opinion that all
panel members can agree on can be a painstaking process:
Once an opinion is circulated, the judges on the panel and their clerks scrutinize it
very closely. Often they suggest modifications, deletions, or additions, It is quite
common for judges to exchange lengthy memoranda about a proposed opinion. Some-
times, differences can't be ironed out, precipitating a concurrence or dissent. By con-
trast, the phrasing (as opposed to the result) of [an unpublished opinion] is given rel-
atively little scrutiny by the other chambers; dissents and concurrences are rare.
Id. at 44.
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the judicial system. What results from this full adjudicative
process is often fine tuning or all out redrafting of the opinion, or
even alteration of the outcome.
In short, evidence indicates that courts often use precedent-
stripping rules as a means to knowingly forgo formal and complete
adjudication of issues for various reasons. The problem is com-
pounded by the reality that even where misuse of precedent-
stripping is not knowing, judges often forgo the deliberative seg-
ment of adjudication associated with opinion writing based on the
presumptuous hunch that those cases implicate the relevant law
only to an extent already addressed in prior published opinions.
78
This reality-which for the moment we will assume presents pro-
cedural due process problems-is systemic in the federal appellate
courts. The question arises, then, as what to do about it. The an-
swer arguably lies in the logic of the Supreme Court's prophylactic
rule jurisprudence, a subject to which I now turn.
TV. "OVERPROTECTING" RIGHTS: THE EXIGENCIES THAT INSPIRE
PROPHYLACTIC RULES
Unlike in the early hypothetical, when courts misuse precedent-
stripping rules, it's virtually impossible to tell. As Judge Arnold
noted, if judges wish to decide a case based on "extraneous rea-
son Es] . . . they can easily do so through the device of an abbre-
viated, unpublished opinion, and no one will ever be the wiser."79
This fact not only means that panels feel more comfortable resort-
ing to this "device ," it also makes it all but impossible for litigants
to demonstrate abbreviated review. How, then, can litigants rea-
listically establish the type of facts on which a procedural due
process argument must be predicated? Without some relief from
the normal burdens of proof, the answer is that in most cases they
cannot.
This problem of undetectability is not novel. The Court's deci-
sion in Miranda is a good example of how, when faced with gov-
ernment misconduct that is empirically known to be widespread,
but that is also virtually impossible to prove in individual cases,
the Court has distilled from express constitutional mandates
78. This is especially true given that the decision not to publish an opinion usually
occurs early in the process. The entire efficiency goal of non-publication would be defeated
were judges to decide not to publish an opinion only after drafting a full opinion with the
presumption of publication.
79. Arnold, supra note 54, at 223; see also Pether, supra note 4, at 1483-84 ("[Slcrutiny
of what the courts are doing is made difficult in many cases and impossible in others.").
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prophylactic rules-roughly meaning rules that operate to protect
more than just the core constitutional right, because "over-
protection" is necessary in order to avoid unacceptably extreme
under-protection of the core right. Strictly speaking, the meaning
of "prophylactic rule" is not yet settled. 80 Professor Klein defines a
"constitutionally prophylactic rule" as a:
doctrinal rule or legal requirement determined by the Court
as appropriate for deciding whether an explicit or "true" fed-
eral constitutional rule is applicable. It may be triggered by
less than a showing that the explicit rule was violated, but
provides approximately the same result as a showing that the
explicit rule was violated. It is appropriate only upon two de-
terminations: first, that simply providing relief upon a show-
ing that the explicit right was violated is ineffective; second,
that use of this rule will be more effective and involve only ac-
ceptable costs.8 1
The most expansive definition of "prophylactic rules" is that they
are necessary corollaries of constitutional mandates: Brian
Landsberg argues that "[t]hese rules inhere in the nature of any
constitutive document designed to advance normative values. And
they inhere in the function of courts."82 David Strauss has power-
fully observed that prophylactic rules are so much an inherent
aspect of constitutional adjudication that their existence as a dis-
tinct conceptual species of rules is essentially illusory; this is be-
cause when courts decide constitutional cases, "they consider not
only the constitutional values at stake, but also the institutional
difficulties that courts face in advancing those values."83 Accord-
80. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decisional Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 14
(2004) (noting that "the term is susceptible to a great many interpretations").
81. Susan R. Klein, The Fate of the Pre-Dickerson Exceptions to Miranda: Identifying
and (Re)formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe H-arbors, and Incidental Rights in C~onstitu-
tional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICHI. L. REV. 1030, 1032-33 (2001); see also Tracy A. Tho-
mas, Understanding Prophylactic Remedies Through the Looking Glass of Bush v. Gore, 11
Wm. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 343, 374 (2002) (noting that "[pirophylactic relief is a term of
art"); cf. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 368-69 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Appar-
ently as a means of identifying rules that it disfavors, the Court repeatedly uses the term
' prophylactic rule' . . [ufit is important to remember, however, that all rules of law are
prophylactic .. .. An argument that a rule of law may be ignored, avoided, or manipulated
simply because it is 'prophylactic' is nothing more than an argument against the rule of law
itself." (citation omitted)).
82. Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: The Uses and Limits of
Prophylactic Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925, 926 (1999).
83. David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 192
(1988).
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ing to Strauss, then, courts routinely integrate these latter consid-
erations into their constitutional holdings even when such hold-
ings are not subsequently conceptualized by observers as prophy-
lactic rules. Thus, according to Mitch Berman, prophylactic
rules-or what he terms "constitutional decision rules"-"are a
ubiquitous component of constitutional doctrine" 84 even if courts
do not tag their prudential creations as "prophylactic rules."
The most often discussed specimen of the Court's prophylactic
rule jurisprudence is Miranda.85 There, the Court considered fine-
tuning the rubric used to determine whether custodial confessions
of criminal defendants are admissible at trial. Since long before
Miranda, courts administered this rule by examining on a case-by-
case basis whether the evidence demonstrated that a given confes-
sion was secured because the defendant's "will was overborne" by
authorities.86 In Miranda, however, the Court created and applied
a superseding standard, one borne out of what the Court perceived
to be the practical realities of police interrogations.
In Miranda, there was no evidence before the Court that the
confession at issue was in fact the product of police coercion. As
the Court noted, "To be sure, the records do not evince overt phys-
ical coercion or patent psychological ploys."87 In holding that Mi-
randa's confession was nevertheless inadmissible, the Court em-
phasized the fact that, pursuant to modern law enforcement tech-
niques, interrogation:
still takes place in privacy. Privacy results in secrecy and this
in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact
goes on in the interrogation rooms. A valuable source of in-
formation about present police practices however may be
found in various police manuals and texts which document
procedures employed with success in the past, and which rec-
ommend various other effective tactics. . . . By considering
84. Berman, supra note 80, at 15.
85. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 81, at 1030-31 (2001) (labeling as the "Miranda conun-
drum" the constitutional questions that prophylactic rules beg generally, and noting that
her solution to the "conundrum" "justifies not only Miranda but a host of similar Warren,
Burger, and Rehnquist Court decisions as well").
86. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); Culombe v. Connect-
icut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) ("The ultimate test remains that which has been the only
clearly established test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of volun-
tariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by
its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his
will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use
of his confession offends due process.").
87. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
Vol. 48584
Summer 2010Precedent- Stripping58
these texts and other data, it is possible to describe proce-
dures observed and noted around the country.88
After describing the recommended practices in detail, the Court
stated:
From these representative samples of interrogation tech-
niques, the setting prescribed by the manuals and observed in
practice becomes clear. In essence, it is [to] . .. undermine II
[the subject's] will to resist. . .. When normal procedures fail
to produce the needed result, the police may resort to decep-
tive stratagems such as giving false legal advice. . . . Even
without employing brutality, the "third degree" or the specific
stratagems described above, the very fact of custodial interro-
gation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on
the weakness of individuals. 89
From these two considerations-the inherent inability of courts
to determine what takes place in specific interrogations given the
privacy that characterizes them, and evidence suggesting what
happens generally during police interrogations-the Court con-
cluded that abandoning the case-by-case standard of coercion-in-
fact was necessary in order to provide "adequate safeguards. to
protect precious Fifth Amendment rights."90 That rule was to re-
quire police to apprise detainees of their rights before attempting
to interrogate them, including the Fifth Amendment right to re-
main silent and avoid interrogation altogether.
In short, the Miranda Court decided that the traditional case-
by-case test was unrealistically stringent. In theory it rendered
inadmissible forced confessions, but it too often stripped the Fifth
Amendment of any practical force largely because of the difficulty
of proving coercion in specific cases. As Professor Klein has noted,
prior to Miranda "[tlhe Court tried for thirty years to ensure that
coerced confessions were not admitted in criminal trials."91 This,
combined with information about widely used police interrogation
tactics, called for a remedial blunt instrument the acceptable inci-
dental effect of which is to sometimes trigger Fifth Amendment
protections in cases where the right to avoid self-incrimination is
not truly implicated.
88. Id. at 448-49.
89. Id. at 455.
90. Id. at 457.
91. Klein, supra note 81, at 1035.
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The Court likely straddles the boundaries of its Article III power
in promulgating prophylactic rules, as many of these rules directly
discipline state law enforcement practices. As such, because the
Supreme Court lacks the jurisdiction to promulgate state law en-
forcement procedures, but only to announce constitutional limita-
tions on those procedures, prophylactic rules are best rationalized
as rules of constitutional logistics that are necessary to effectuate
the substantive protections the Constitution affords, and thus fall
within the province of the Court to impose on states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.92 Unsurprisingly, then, the Court's re-
cent treatment of the Miranda rule reinforces the characterization
of it as a prophylactic constitutional rule.
As Professor Caminker has discussed,93 the Court recently in
Dickerson v. United States94 faced the question of whether the rule
announced in Miranda was a "constitutional rule," or a non-
constitutional rule the type of which Congress may supersede by
statute.95 There, the district court suppressed evidence against
Dickerson on Miranda grounds, despite Congress's 1968 passage
of 18 U.S.C. § 3501, the intent of which was to legislatively over-
rule Miranda by requiring the exclusion from evidence only con-
fessions coerced-in- fact. 9 6 The Fourth Circuit reversed the district
court's suppression, ruling that Miranda was not a constitutional
rule, and therefore that it was validly superseded by § 3501.97 The
Supreme Court disagreed. After seeming to hedge on the issue of
whether Mirandizing arrestees is itself constitutionally required,
Justice Rehnquist speaking for the Court asserted that "Miranda
announced a constitutional rule."9 8
The remainder of the opinion brings into relief precisely what
the Court meant by "constitutional rule."99 First, the Court dis-
92. If this seems question-begging and tenuous, I do not necessarily disagree. I at-
tempt here only to rationalize precedent, not defend it. I agree that prophylactic rules raise
serious jurisdictional concerns, but whether they are categorically illegitimate is irrelevant
for present purposes. Prophylactic rules are "good law," so my argument is, in a sense, only
a positivist offering.
93. Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles of 'Trophylactic" Rules, 70 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1 (2001).
94. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
95. Id. at 431-32.
96. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1999).
97. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 691.
98. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444.
99. Professor Mlein has expressed her view that the Court in Dickerson wholly dodged
the question of whether Miranda established a constitutional rule, characterizing the Dick-
erson Court as "refusing to label the Miranda warnings either a prophylactic rule or [the
product ofl pure constitutional interpretation."). Mlein, supra note 81, at 1070. See also
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cussed the dissent's view that Miranda represents judicial over-
reaching because it imposed on state law enforcement limitations
exceeding what was necessary to satisfy constitutional require-
ments. 00 Noting that Miranda was a response to "the advent of
modern custodial police interrogation,"'10' the majority responded
by noting that the Miranda "constitutional rule" was borne of the
fact that "reliance on the traditional totality-of-the-circumstances
test raised a risk of overlooking an involuntary custodial confes-
sion, a risk that the Court [in Miranda] found unacceptably
great." 02 In concluding that Congress could not overrule Mi ran-
da, the Dickerson Court necessarily announced the Miranda rule
to be of constitutional status, even if not the product of pure con-
stitutional interpretation.
Other examples of prophylactic rules abound. For example, Pro-
fessor Klein has discussed the Court's creation of prophylactic
rules to determine whether searches are "reasonable" for Fourth
Amendment purposes,103 and Professor Strauss has discussed
prophylactic rules that protect First Amendment rights. 0 4  In-
deed, fortuitously, the Court very recently announced a prophylac-
tic rule for the specific purpose of ensuring fair adjudication in
appellate courts. In Caperton v. A. T Massey Coal Co.. Inc., 05 a
West Virginia jury found Massey liable under various common-
law theories and returned for Caperton a $50 million award.
Knowing that state Supreme Court Justice Brent Benjamin would
sit to hear Massey's appeal, Massey's chairman donated $3 million
to Benjamin's reelection campaign, a total that exceeded all other
contributions for Benjamin combined. In the ensuing appeal, Ben-
jamin refused to recuse himself; he and his fellow justices then
reversed the jury's verdict.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari106 on the issue of
whether Benjamin's refusal to recuse himself worked a denial of
Caminker, supra note 93, at 5-6. For present purposes, however, labels matter little. What
matters is that the Court has treated the Miranda rule as a prophylactic rule, as it is rid-
dled with numerous pragmatic exceptions, and was expressly established, and continues to
be upheld, on the basis that it is necessary to ensure practical protection of Fifth Amend-
ment rights.
100. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442-44.
101. Id. at 434.
102. Id. at 442 (internal citation omitted).
103. Klein, supra note 81, at 1045-47.
104. See Strauss, supra note 83, at 195-97 (discussing Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1938)).
105. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
106. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 593 (2008).
Summer 2010 587
588 ~Duquesne Law ReviewVo.4
Caperton's due process right to a fair appeal, even though Benja-
min had no direct financial stake in the outcome of the appeal. In
answering in the affirmative, the Court first noted its traditional
position that "most matters relating to judicial disqualification
[do] not rise to a constitutional level," 107 and that "[plersonal bias
or prejudice 'alone [is] not [a] sufficient basis for imposing a con-
stitutional requirement under the Due Process Clause." 08 How-
ever, as a prelude to its expansive holding, the Court then noted
that "[a]s new problems have emerged . .. experience teaches that
the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision-
maker . . . [can be] too high to be constitutionally tolerable."109 It
then discussed the two categories of cases where the Court has
held that recusal is constitutionally mandated: cases wherein a
judge has a direct financial interest in the litigation, or in the con-
tempt context, where the judge, although having no financial in-
terest, was "challenged because of a conflict arising from his par-
ticipation in an earlier proceeding." 10
After noting that the context of judicial elections was a novel
one vis-A-vis the recusal context, the Court tackled the question of
whether Massey's "pivotal role in getting Justice Benjamin elected
created a constitutionally intolerable probability of actual bias.""1
The Court began answering this question by discussing the per-
sonal introspection of the judge, which governs the question of re-
cusal in the first instance, and by noting that "[t]here are in-
stances when the introspection that often attends this process
may reveal that what the judge had assumed to be a proper, con-
trolling factor [in her decision] is not the real one at work":"12
The difficulties of inquiring into actual bias, and the fact that
the inquiry is often a private one, simply underscore the need
for objective rules. Otherwise there may be no adequate pro-
tection against a judge who simply misreads or misappre-
hends the real motives at work in deciding the case. The
judge's own inquiry into actual bias, then, is not one that the
law can easily superintend or review, though actual bias, if
disclosed, no doubt would be grounds for appropriate relief. In
107. Caperton, 129 S.Ct. at 2259 (citing FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 702
(1948)).
108. Id. (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820 (1986)).
109. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. Id. at 2260.61.
111. Id. at 2262.
112. Caperton, 129 S.Ct. at 2263.
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lieu of exclusive reliance on that personal inquiry, or on ap-
pellate review of the judge's determination respecting actual
bias, the Due Process Clause has been implemented by objec-
tive standards that do not require proof of actual bias.113
From these premises, the Court declared that "[d]ue process re-
quires an objective inquiry into whether the contributor's influ-
ence on the election under all the circumstances 'would offer a
possible temptation to the average. ... judge to. ... lead him not to
hold the balance nice, clear and true"' between the parties. 14 The
Court then concluded that the risk that Massey's influence "en-
gendered actual bias" was "sufficiently substantial" such "that it
must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be ade-
quately implemented." 11 5
Although the Court in Caperton did not employ the phrase
"cprophylactic rule"-it rarely does-Caperton no doubt establishes
one. Indeed, its formulation perfectly parallels the logic of Mi ran-
da. The Court's decision turned on the reality that, in some con-
texts, bias-in-fact is virtually impossible to detect and prove. That
is, because "[tlhe judge's own inquiry into actual bias . .. is not
one that the law can easily superintend or review," giving force to
the procedural due process rights of litigants in these contexts re-
quires the use of an objective rule, one that will be triggered re-
gardless of whether there is any actual bias in a given case, and
thus regardless of whether the respective litigant is denied a fair
tribunal."16
In short, decisions such as Miranda and Caperton, as well as
descriptive scholarly work discussing prophylactic rules generally,
reveal that such rules arise when the Court deems them necessary
to protect core constitutional rights, and narrower rules would
yield an unacceptable degree of under-protection. Or, as Professor
Landsberg puts it, prophylactic rules are "designed to correct for
the ineffectiveness of more direct prohibitions"; the ineffectiveness
of a direct prohibition "stems in part from the human tendency to
stretch compliance with core rules and in part from the difficulties
of detecting and punishing violations of many core rules."117 By
now, then, it should be fairly clear how the logic of prophylactic
113. Id. at 2263.
114. Id. at 2264. (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
115. Id. (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
116. Id. at 2263.
117. Landsberg, supra note 82, at 929.
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rules applies to the context of judges misusing precedent- striping
to forgo thorough or fair adjudication of appeals, the subject to
which I now turn.
V. GETTING TO THE PROPHYLAXIS
The legitimacy of prophylactic rules is not the focus of this ar-
ticle; that is, important issues such as whether the Court's crea-
tion of them is ultra vires, 118 or infringes on states' rights.119 Ra-
ther, because prophylactic rules are an entrenched aspect of con-
stitutional law, 120 it is only natural to consider whether a new
prophylactic rule is warranted in circumstances presenting the
same exigencies as in cases like Miranda and Caperton. If, empir-
ically speaking, courts' misuse of prece dent- stripping is as system-
ically pernicious as the interrogation methods at issue in Mi ran-
da, and if such harm is as equally difficult to prove in individual
cases such that requiring litigants to prove it would work an un-
der-protection of procedural due process rights in the appellate
courts, it follows that a prophylactic rule against precedent-
stripping is justified.
This syllogism, of course, depends on a premise that hereto I
have asked the reader to assume: that the full and fair adjudica-
tion often denied by courts' misuse of precedent- stripping impli-
cates a cognizable procedural due process interest. While it may
seem obvious to most readers that it does, it may not to others. Of
course, the reporters are replete with the aspirational platitudes
about "fairness" that are grist for preliminary-round moot court
arguments, or for briefs by pro se litigants claiming unfair
118. See, e.g., id. at 925 ("May the Supreme Court, the institution charged by the Consti-
tution with enforcing core rules, protect against the violation of constitutional rights by
adopting measures designed to minimize the risk of such violations, even when those
measures are not specifically authorized by the Constitution? Or will the adoption of such
prophylactic rules in fact subvert the Constitution by unduly enlarging the powers of the
rule enforcer?"); Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of
Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 100, 101 (1985) ("fjProphylactic rules raise a ques-
tion of constitutional legitimacy.").
119. See Grano, supra note 118, at 125, 128 ("The teaching of Erie ... is that the mere
grant of jurisdiction by article III does not carry accompanying authority for federal courts
to promulgate a general common law either binding on the state courts or superseding their
law in federal courts. . .. The state sovereignty argnment takes on added force when the
federal courts seek to overturn state court judgments that do not actually violate either the
federal Constitution or a valid federal statute.").
120. For a long but nevertheless non-exhaustive list of such prophylactic rules-as well
as "safe harbor" rules that under-protect constitutional rights in favor of providing law
enforcement breathing room, see Mein, supra note 81, at 1036-51.
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process. 121 To invoke this question-begging language to define the
contours of the right I claim exists might seem facile and insuffi-
cient to some. As such, before continuing with the analogy with
Miranda and with the discussion of the proposed prophylactic
rule, I discuss briefly why procedural due process doctrine in its
current formulation necessarily gives rise to a right of appellants
to a full and fair adjudication of their appeals, and how such fair-
ness is denied when judges engage in the practices discussed
above.
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall "be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" by
the federal government.122 Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that no state may "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."'12 3 While the Fourteenth
Amendment, of course, applies only to the states, the general con-
sensus is that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
imposes the same constraints on the federal government as the
Fourteenth does on the states. 24 As such, although a large major-
ity of Supreme Court due process case law deals with the Four-
teenth Amendment, such does not diminish its applicability to the
conduct of the federal courts.
Neither amendment tells us what specific interests are pro-
tected; rather, for purposes of procedural (as opposed to substan-
tive) due process, the interests protected are those created by "in-
121. See, e.g., Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) ("The neutrality re-
quirement helps to guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of
an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law. At the same time, it preserves
both the appearance and reality of fairness, generating the feeling, so important to a popu-
lar government, that justice has been done." (internal citations and quotation marks omit-
ted)); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975) ("[A] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process. (internal quotations omitted)).
122. U.S. CONST. amend V.
12-3. U.S. CONST. amend. XTV, § 1.
124. See, e.g., Republic of Pan. v. BCCI Holdings S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 944 (11th Cir. 1997)
("Because the language and motivating policies of the due process clauses of these two
amendments are substantially similar, opinions interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment
due process clause provide important guidance for us in determining what due process
requires in cases involving nationwide service of process."); Welch v. Thompson, 20 F.3d
636, 639 (5th Cir. 1994) ("We look to federal constitutional law to determine whether
La.R.S. 15:1111 creates a legitimate claim or entitlement protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, the due process analysis is the same in
measuring the Louisiana statute against the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment as it
would be under the Fifth Amendment. We analyze procedural due process questions using
a two-step inquiry. .. ); Raditch v. United States, 929 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1991) (dis-
cussing post -deprivation remedies and noting that "[a]lthough Hudson involved § 1983 and
the Fourteenth Amendment, the same due process principles apply to the federal govern-
ment through the Fifth Amendment").
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dependent sources," usually statutes.125 As the Court has put it,
the "dimensions" of cognizable interests are "defined by existing
rules or understandings . . . that secure certain benefits and that
support claims of entitlement to those benefits."126 Thus, for ex-
ample, although the poor enjoy no substantive constitutional right
to welfare benefits, a state may not discontinue such benefits
without providing recipients the process established by the respec-
tive state for determining eligibility; thus, welfare benefits may be
a cognizable property interest for purposes of procedural due
process.'12 7
In 28 U.S.C. § 1291 Congress granted to the federal appellate
courts jurisdiction over all appeals from "all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States."'12 8 While the statute does not
expressly bestow upon federal court litigants the right to bring
direct appeals in every case, the Supreme Court has read § 1291
as giving rise to "appeals as of right."129 The Court has invigo-
rated that right by asserting that when an appellant exercises an
appeal as of right, procedural due process translates into a right to
an appeal that counts. For example, in Douglas v. California,30
the Court held that states must provide indigent appellants with
counsel because doing so is necessary to make the appellate
process "meaningful." In Evitts v. Lucey,131 the Court extended
the reasoning of Douglas by holding that the mandate of Douglas
is not satisfied if appellate counsel's performance is exceedingly
poor. The Court emphasized that it is not enough to allow a per-
125. See, e.g., Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 441 (1979).
126. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
127. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) ("Such benefits are a matter of
statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them. Their termination involves
state action that adjudicates important rights. T1he constitutional challenge cannot be
answered by an argument that public assistance benefits are 'a "privilege" and not a
"right."").
128. The statute reads:
§ 1291. Final decisions of district courts
The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts
of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal
Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except
where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court....
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006).
129. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 865 (1994) ("Section
1291 of the Judicial Code confines appeals as of right to those from final decisions of the
district courts." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
130. 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963).
131. 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
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son to appeal when they have the right to do so under state law.
Rather, due process requires states to take extra steps to ensure
that the appeal is "more than a 'meaningless ritual.""132 Further,
in holding that indigent appellants have a right to a free copy of
lower court transcripts, the Court stated in Griffin v. Illinois, that
when appeals are taken as of right, due process requires the pro-
vision of any resource necessary to make the appellate process
"adequate and effective."'133 Indeed, recently in Caperton, the
Court premised its procedural due process holding on the axiom
that "[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process."134 Given that the Court went on to find a denial of due
process in the West Virginia state appellate process, the axiom
obviously applies in the appellate context, and obviously may be
implicated when judges use their power in ways that cast suspi-
cion on the fairness of an appeal, even if prejudice is not manifest.
When a court fails to fully adjudicate an appeal, it denies the
appellant the process to which she is due; this should be so ob-
vious as to seem almost tautological. When a court either pre-
sumes an appeal to be meritless because of its nature, or knowing-
ly forgoes formal resolution of an issue properly before the court
due to a desire to truncate thorough consideration of the appeal, it
denies the appellant full and fair adjudication of her arguments,
and therefore the appeal becomes either a "meaningless ritual," or
at the very least, the appellate process ceases to be "effective" in
the manner arguably contemplated in decisions like Griffin. Re-
member that Evitts teaches that it is not sufficient for due process
purposes for the government to go through the motions of provid-
ing some appellate process to a litigant if the government's failure
to provide that litigant with lower court transcripts results in a
failure to subject lower court conduct, or the principles that in-
spired that conduct, to rigorous and thorough examination
through the adversarial process. 35 So too due process is denied
132. Id. at 394.
133. 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (noting that due process requires "adequate and effective"
appellate review); see also Evitts, 469 U.S. at 393 ("[P1rocedures used in deciding appeals
must comport with the demands of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Constitution"); Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 302 (5th Cir. 1980) ("We are convinced that
due process can be denied by any substantial retardation of the appellate process, including
an excessive delay in the furnishing of a transcription of testimony necessary for comple-
tion of an appellate record.").
134. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
135. Evitts, 469 U.S. at 394 (fittest emphasizing the "premise of our adversary system,"
then concluding that the right to a direct appeal is not satisfied unless counsel "play[s] the
role of an active advocate[,]" because the right to effective assistance of counsel in the trial
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when such absence of rigorous and thorough examination is not
the product of a denial of effective counsel (as in Evitts) but rather
the result of the respective court's decision not to perform it before
disposition; under either scenario, the litigant does not enjoy the
systemic vigilance that most characterizes true "adjudication"' of
legal issues and arguments.
With precedent such as Griffin, Evitts, and Douglas forming the
backdrop, Caperton is best viewed as confirmation that procedural
due process requires a fair adjudication of appeals taken as of
right, but also a declaration that prophylactic rules to ensure pro-
tection of the right are appropriate to limit the discretion of judges
to engage in conduct that threatens the procedural due process
protections of litigants. As noted above, this feature of Caperton
squares it with the archetypal prophylactic reasoning of Miranda;
these two decisions are models for a prophylactic rule in the
precedent- stripping context.
My suggestion that the term "adjudication" connotes a mini-
mum threshold of formality and fairness with which cases are to
be decided-much as a product of Congress is not termed "legisla-
tion" if it is not vetted through the procedural formalities making
it deserving of that status-is reinforced by the Court's non-
delegation case law. For example, in Northern Pipeline Construc-
tion Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., the Court declared unconstitu-
tional the broad grant of jurisdiction to non-Article III bankruptcy
courts to render final judgment on state law claims because such a
grant of jurisdiction "impermissibly removed most, if not all, of
'the essential attributes of the judicial power' from the Art. III dis-
trict court[s].113 6 For the most part, the Court's conclusion of un-
constitutionality was premised on the fact that such a broad grant
of jurisdictional power to the bankruptcy courts allowed those
courts to decide the common law rights of the claimants without
providing them all of the safeguards of Article III adjudication.137
context (which the Court extended to direct appeals) "cannot be satisfied by mere formal
appointment" of counsel (internal quotation marks omitted)).
136. 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982).
137. While not delving into "individual rights" per se, the Court's reason for discussing
basic separation of powers doctrine was clearly to emphasize that the Bankruptcy Act's
unconstitutionality followed from the degree to which it infringed on the right of claimants
to have their claims heard by Article III tribunals. See id. at 84, 87 ("We hold that the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978 carries the possibility of . .. an unwarranted encroachment [on
judicial power] . . .. [because] [m]any of the [individual] rights subject to adjudication by
the Act's bankruptcy courts ... are not of Congress' creation. . .. Mhe Bankruptcy Act ...
has impermissibly removed most, if not all, of the essential attributes of the judicial power
from the Art. III district court, and has vested those attributes in a non-Art. III adjunct.
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In this sense, the Court made clear that the non-delegation doc-
trine is not only concerned with separation-of-powers, but also the
procedural rights of litigants (or, perhaps to put more correctly,
that separation-of-powers principles exist primary to protect indi-
vidual liberty, and are therefore the two concerns are inextricably
intertwined). 13 8
The Court expounded on Northern Pipeline in Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission v. Schor.'39 In reviewing whether Con-
gress could grant the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
the jurisdiction to "entertain" state law counterclaims in its ad-
ministrative proceedings, the Court noted:
Article 111, § 1, serves both to protect the role of the indepen-
dent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite
government, and to safeguard litigants' right to have claims
decided before judges who are free from potential domination
by other branches of government. .... [T]his guarantee serves
to protect primarily personal, rather than structural, inter-
ests."'140
While neither Article III nor the Schor opinion directly describe
a right of appellants to enjoy a minimum threshold of thorough-
ness in presenting their arguments to the courts, the point is that
Article III, by the very fact that it establishes power that is "judi-
cial," also establishes the right of litigants to enjoy all the benefits
of the exercise of judicial power. If we accept the premise that the
power of the courts is to "say what the law is"-rather than to say
what it might or should be-it is not a great leap to argue that
Article III promises to litigants a process that disposes of their
claims only on premises deserving of the status of "law." If a
Such a grant of jurisdiction cannot be sustained as an exercise of Congress' power." (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
138. See id. Which, of course, is not a novel proposition, as it's a recurring theme in case
law. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2247 (2008) ("In our own system the
Suspension Clause . .. protects the rights of the detained by a means consistent with the
essential design of the Constitution. It ensures that, except during periods of formal sus-
pension [of the writ of habeas corpus], the Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the
writ, to maintain the delicate balance of governance that is itself the surest safeguard of
liberty." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[The Constitution diffuses power the better
to secure liberty."); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("Liberty is always at stake when one or more of the branches seek to trans-
gress the separation of powers.").
139. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
140. Schor, 478 U.S. at 848 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
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judge, in invoking propositions or principles in disposing of cases,
is, at the same time, unwilling to commit to those propositions as
binding statements of "what the law is" for future like cases, he is
(unless the case does truly qualify as utterly redundant) necessari-
ly admitting a lack of confidence that his premises are truly law.
Instead, he is declaring "this is what the law might be were we to
decide this issue definitively." As such, it is worth asking: How is
the resulting opinion functionally different than a constitutionally
forbidden advisory opinion?
Regardless of where one finds the specific contours of the right
at issue, the evidence accumulated over the past several decades
strongly suggests the existence of an unofficial policy, slowly nur-
tured (intentionally or not) by judges who rightly feel overworked,
of using precedent-stripping rules to dispose of appeals in circums-
tances where such appeals, given their factual or legal nuances,
should be disposed of in precedential opinions. The apparent fre-
quent misuse of precedent- stripping, combined with the peculiar
insidiousness of such misuse given the insular nature of the judi-
ciary, amounts to a systemic threat to appellants' due process
rights by, in the name of pragmatism, disposing of appeals with-
out full and thorough adjudication. Further, the practically in-
surmountable burden of proving such unfairness in specific cases
makes unrealistic the notion that a specific litigant should be re-
quired to prove that the relevant judges did in fact cut corners.
These realities-the empirical conspicuousness of the government
conduct at issue and the difficulty of proving it in specific cases-
inspired the Court's Miranda and Caperton decisions, and the log-
ic of those decisions supports the creation of a prophylactic rule
that "over-protects" appellants' right to procedural due process by
forbidding precedent- stripping in all cases.
One might respond that if prophylactic rules exist only to the
extent they are necessary to protect core rights, is not a remedy
less drastic than an all-out prohibition of precedent- stripping
more appropriate? In this vein, an alternative remedy might be a
new rule of burden allocation: a litigant could establish a prima
facie case of arbitrary appeal disposition if a precedent-stripping
rule was used to dispose of her arguments. The prima facie case of
arbitrariness could be rebutted if the other party (probably the
court as respondent) could demonstrate, say, that no reasonable
judge could have, given existing precedent, decided the case at
hand differently, or that no reasonable judge could have concluded
that the given appeal implicated no refinement of governing law.
Obviously, such a process would be unrealistically cumbersome,
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and would exacerbate the very efficiency problems the courts are
attempting to alleviate via their current precedent- stripping prac-
tices. Further, such an idea poses the obvious problem of who
would enforce it meaningfully. Assuming the rule did not rely on
the unrealistic expectation that the Supreme Court would grant
certiorari in every relevant case, it would mean that the very ap-
pellate court that violated the rule would be responsible for ensur-
ing its integrity on petition for rehearing. Although rehearing pa-
nels are usually comprised of a different group of three judges
than the panel originally deciding the case, one could not be
blamed for wondering whether the second panel members, who
are likely responsible for nurturing-or at least entertaining for
purposes of collegiality-the court culture endorsing the misuse of
precedent-stripping, can be relied on to rigorously enforce such a
rule.
A better argument is that the prophylactic rule should simply
take the form of the Supreme Court forbidding the federal appel-
late courts from stripping their dispositions of precedential value.
Not only would this solution prevent the administrative burdens
noted above, it would cure the systemic threat to due process
while minimally affecting the primary stated purpose of non-
publication-to keep the reporters uncluttered with opinions that
offer nothing new. Were a circuit court prohibited from stripping
a given opinion of precedential effect, the court could still desig-
nate the opinion as "unpublished," meaning that the court did not
at the time of disposition deem it to represent any refinement or
clarification of governing law. Such designation would serve as an
easy way of delineating for practitioners that case law deserving of
focus from that less so deserving, while still allowing attorneys to
research and rely upon the unpublished decisions at the margins
should such cases represent misapplication of unpublication rules
in the first place. Indeed, as noted before, if the unpublished dis-
position is not of such value, its citation would be pointless.
VI. CONCLUSION
The federal courts are not packed with unprincipled judges
seeking to deny litigants due process. However, evidence strongly
suggests that over the past four decades, an attitude within the
federal appellate courts has slowly developed around precedent-
stripping that any use of the practice to further efficiency interests
is not without virtue, even if not formally supported by the respec-
tive local precedent-stripping rules. The exigencies that have nur-
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tured this attitude are very real, but the way courts have dealt
with them-by rationing the deliberateness which should charac-
terize disposition of all appeals to only certain cases or certain ap-
pellants-is obnoxious to procedural due process. Using the logic
of Supreme Court prophylactic-rule case law as a guide, the con-
spicuousness of inappropriate precedent- stripping as a systemic
problem combined with the difficulty of proving such impropriety
in individual cases arguably supports the creation of a prophylac-
tic rule prohibiting precedent- stripping.
As a final note, I must register my appreciation for the reality
that the federal courts currently face extreme practical burdens.
No doubt, much of the misuse of precedent-stripping discussed
above is the product of judges' attempts to manage an ever in-
creasing workload without correspondingly increasing resources.
Some of these judges have admirably recognized the problem and
have proposed remedial alternatives to precedent -stripping. 14 '
But even if we assume that the good-faith triage that characteriz-
es a fraction of the justice -rationing actually describes all inci-
dents of inappropriate precedent- stripping, such is cold comfort to
litigants who are denied thorough adjudication of their argu-
ments. The question, then, becomes, how should we respond to
the problem? By over- sympathizing with judges' complaints that
they are overworked, and cavalierly 42 accepting "efficiency" as the
primary determinant in whether litigants receive their due
process? Or do we insist that the courts no longer enable Con-
gress's failure to address the problem via its current precedent-
stripping practices, and further insist that Congress increase the
number of federal appellate judgeships or decrease the federal
courts' exclusive jurisdiction?.
141. See, e.g., Stephen Reinhardt, Surveys Without Solutions: Another Study of the
United States Courts of Appeals, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1505, 1513 (1995) (book review). Judge
Reinhardt, responding to resistance to increasing the number of federal appellate judge-
ships, states:
It is clear that the opposition to adding enough judges to handle our overwhelming
caseload properly lies in the traditional view of the appellate ideal, We federal judges
are simply unable to abandon our notion of the appellate courts as small, cohesive
entities operating in a pristine and sheltered atmosphere. It appears that, rather
than surrender this wholly unrealistic and outdated vision of the federal judiciary,
many of us are willing to ration justice.
Id.
142. See Diane Adams-Strickland, Don't Quote Me: The Law of Judicial Communica-
tions in Federal Appellate Practice and the Constitutionality of Proposed Rule 32.1, 14
CommLAw CONSPECTUS 133, 163 (2005) ('To say that an assault on judicial efficiency is
insufficient to support publication plans and no-citation rules is naive.").
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The best answer is that we insist that institutions do their re-
spective jobs, and that, when they fail to, we do not excuse them
with trite responses of complacent "realism" or "pragmatism." The
job of the courts is to fully and fairly adjudicate all issues before
them. It is Congress's job to ensure that the courts have the re-
sources they need to do that job adequately; this is especially true
given that it is Congress that has repeatedly burdened the courts
by creating new remedies and by statutorily increasing the avail-
ability of the federal venue. As such, perhaps things must get
worse before they get better. The body responsible for ultimately
fixing the problem is one that responds only to pressure from
those experiencing the practical drawbacks of bad policy. If
precedent- stripping ends but nothing else changes, the wheels of
justice will no doubt slow. Perhaps it is only then that sufficient
pressure on Congress will arise so as to motivate reform.

